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AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON 
PREEMPTION 
Keith N. Hylton* 
Abstract: This Essay has two goals. The first is to present an economic 
theory of preemption as a choice among regulatory regimes. The optimal 
regime choice model is used to generate specific implications for the 
court decisions on preemption of products liability claims. The second 
objective is to extrapolate from the regime choice model to consider its 
implications for broader controversies about preemption. 
Introduction 
 After decades of case law and commentary,1 preemption remains a 
controversial topic. It has been viewed as part of a program to federal-
ize substantial pieces of state law,2 as a device through which federal 
government power expands,3 and as a general source of legal doctrines 
in search of a basis in constitutional law.4 
 This Essay focuses on a specific area of controversy: preemption of 
products liability lawsuits. This is probably the most important area of 
the preemption controversy because it involves enormous investments 
by technology firms and government entities in regulatory infrastruc-
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Searle Civil Justice Institute’s conference “Litigation vs. Regulation: A Model of Economic 
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1 Preemption has been an issue in the case law for a long time, but intense academic 
interest has been relatively recent, and probably the result of conflicts between federal 
regulation and state tort law. One of the first federal cases to address the issue in the prod-
ucts liability setting is Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988). The vast 
majority of articles on preemption have been published after 1990. 
2 See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1353, 1368–69 (2006). 
3 This is clearly an implication of the Issacharoff & Sharkey article, though their focus 
is on the government’s role in controlling cross-state externalities. See id. at 1355–57, 1365–
72. For a clear expression of the concern over preemption’s effect on the balance of state 
and federal power, see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 582–604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in judgment). 
4 See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 807–08 
(1994); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
727, 759–69 (2008). 
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ture. In spite of this focus on a specific area of preemption, the ap-
proach taken here can be generalized to other preemption disputes. 
 I hope to accomplish two objectives. The first is to present an eco-
nomic theory of preemption as a choice among regulatory regimes.5 
The optimal regime choice model will be used to generate specific im-
plications for the court decisions on preemption of products liability 
claims. More specifically, the regime choice model generates a positive 
theory of the preemption case law, reconciling several seemingly con-
flicting decisions. For example, the seemingly inconsistent U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.6 in 2000 
and in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.7 in 2011, are easily rec-
onciled within this framework. 
                                                                                                                     
 The second objective is to extrapolate from the regime choice 
model to consider its implications for broader controversies about pre-
emption.8 The topic has been expanded by commentators into a foil 
for a range of opinions about the relationship between state and fed-
eral law.9 The products liability preemption cases, in contrast, deal with 
a concrete question: should courts regulate, or should an agency, such 
as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), regulate?10 The answer to 
this question has immediate implications for the investments that firms 
make and the corresponding amount of injuries their products inflict 
on consumers. From this concrete problem, a much larger set of issues 
has emerged, many of which are capable of being answered independ-
ently of the concrete issues. It would simplify matters greatly if courts 
recognized the preemption defense, or some version of it, as having a 
basis in the common law, rather than requiring an explicit view of the 
Constitution’s constraints on the federal government’s power to regu-
late. 
 
5 See infra notes 11–46 and accompanying text. 
6 529 U.S. 861, 874, 886 (2000). 
7 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1137–40 (2011). 
8 See infra notes 49–55 and accompanying text. 
9 See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 808; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: 
How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2007); infra 
notes 103–105 and accompanying text. 
10 E.g. Geier, 529 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause does 
not give unelected federal judges carte blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing 
their own ideas of tort reform on the States.”). 
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I. A Model of Regulatory Regime Choice 
 To make the concrete problem in the preemption cases a bit 
clearer, consider a simple model of a products liability preemption dis-
pute. Suppose a manufacturer of medical devices makes a “medical 
widget.” The medical widget is approved by the FDA. A plaintiff is hurt 
by the medical widget and sues the manufacturer on the theory that 
the medical widget is defectively designed. The manufacturer walks in-
to court and argues that the plaintiff’s lawsuit should be dismissed be-
cause the medical widget is regulated by the FDA and its design has 
been approved by the agency. 
 The decision facing the court is at bottom a choice between regu-
latory regimes:11 the court itself or the FDA. If the court finds that the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit is preempted, it says in effect that the FDA will be the 
primary, and in some instances the sole, regulator of the design of the 
medical widget. If it finds that the plaintiff’s lawsuit is not preempted, 
then it is saying, in effect, that the FDA’s regulatory decisions will be 
subject to reconsideration by state (or federal) courts. After all, any 
finding that a design that was approved by the FDA is defective under 
products liability law will have the effect of encouraging firms to adopt 
designs that comply with the court’s product-design views rather than, 
or in addition to, the product-design views of the FDA. 
 A defective design claim is, as many courts have noted, a species of 
negligence claim.12 Under the increasingly standard risk-utility test in 
                                                                                                                      
11 On the economics of regulatory regime choice, see generally Edward L. Glaeser & 
Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. Econ. Literature 401 (2003); Keith N. 
Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory, 16 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 205 
(2008); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 
(1984). The model in the Hylton article differs from the analysis of Shavell mainly by in-
corporating public choice issues into the analysis of regulatory choice. See Hylton, supra, at 
206–07, 212–13. Although I will rely on the model in Hylton in the discussion of econom-
ics below, that model is an extension of Shavell’s. See id. at 212–13. 
12 See, e.g., Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding 
that a manufacturer’s duty of reasonable design rests on principles of negligence law); 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737, 745 (Md. 1974) (holding that design de-
fect products liability claims are governed by negligence principles); Bolm v. Triumph 
Corp., 305 N.E.2d 769, 772–74 (N.Y. 1973) (holding the manufacturer liable under gen-
eral negligence principles for injuries caused by defects in construction or design); Tyson 
v. Long Mfg. Co., 107 S.E.2d 170, 173 (N.C. 1959) (holding that the plaintiff must show 
negligence in the design or construction of a machine in order for the court to find the 
manufacturer liable for negligence); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A 
Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. Legal Stud. 535, 553–54 & n.20 (1985) 
(citing cases); David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 291, 313–15 (2008) (applying 
Learned Hand’s formula for negligence to design defect products liability, substituting 
“defect” for “negligence”). 
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products liability law, a court compares the incremental risk of the spe-
cific product design that is challenged with its incremental utility, in 
comparison to some safer, feasible, alternative design.13 If the incre-
mental risk is notably in excess of the incremental utility, the product 
will be found to have a design defect.14 If defective design liability 
works as desired, it will encourage firms whenever they have the choice 
between two designs to choose the relatively dangerous design only 
when the incremental utility from that design exceeds the incremental 
risk.15 This phenomenon is analogous to the function of the negligence 
rule, which encourages an actor to choose the relatively safe course of 
action whenever the burden of that course is smaller than the incre-
mental harm that would be caused by choosing the unsafe course of 
tio
hat 
 ar
                                                                                                                     
ac n.16 
 I have described the product-design decision and the negligence 
decision as discrete choice problems. Some economic models of negli-
gence treat the choice problem as one of finding the overall optimal 
level of care.17 Tort litigation, however, involves discrete choices, which 
are shaped by plaintiffs.18 Plaintiffs generally come to court with negli-
gence theories of their own construction.19 The negligence cases that 
survive in court are almost always plausible cases in the sense that the 
burden of precaution is less than the incremental risk of not taking 
precaution. In the same sense, one should expect products liability cas-
es often to have the same feature: a claim that seems plausible on its 
face because the plaintiff has identified a relatively safe alternative t
is guably comparable in function to the design that is challenged. 
 The discrete choice assumption is built into this model of regula-
tory choice. In a lawsuit, the plaintiff comes to court with a discrete 
choice problem.20 In the regulatory phase, however, the agency consid-
ers a large number of potential choices.21 The regulatory environment 
 
13 See Hylton, supra note 11, at 212. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Owen, supra note 12, at 313–15. 
17 For an early and foundational model, within this vein, of the incentives created by 
negligence law, see John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal 
Stud. 323, 323–24 (1973). 
18 Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. Legal Stud. 139, 141 (1989). 
19 Id. 
20 See id. 
21 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: 
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531, 1534–42 (1973) (arguing that courts 
applying the negligence standard are an improper forum to consider product-design is-
sues because of the large number of tradeoffs). 
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could result in requirements that are inconsistent with the discrete 
choice approach merely because the comparison of many alternatives 
may produce a result that differs from that based on a comparison of 
two options.22 This discrepancy in available choices is one possible 
source of inconsistency between the regulatory regime and the court 
e the same 
ce
 only if the social benefit from reducing risk 
                                                                                                                     
regime, though I will not consider it here. 
 Faced with the risk of a lawsuit for a defective design, a firm that 
chooses to design its products to avoid liability will presumably suffer 
some compliance cost.23 The most obvious compliance cost is the op-
portunity cost (forgone profit) of the alternative, risky design. Product 
liability actions based on defective design therefore involv
in ntive control issues as the ordinary negligence actions. 
 The benefits from regulation consist of the incremental social 
benefit from reducing injuries by opting for the relatively safe design. 
But this benefit has to be discounted by the additional utility society 
would have gained from the alternative, risky design. The net benefit 
from regulation is positive
exceeds the loss in utility. 
 The net benefit from product safety regulation is therefore made 
up of several components. One is the risk-utility differential, which is 
equivalent to a measure of the consumer welfare differential.24 This 
 
22 Consider, for example, the cycling of preferences under majority rule associated 
with the Condorcet paradox. See, e.g., Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III, at 83–84 
(2003). 
23 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 113–14 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
24 The courts and commentators have set out descriptions of the risk-utility test in 
products liability law. One popular description was offered in John W. Wade, On the Nature 
of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837–38 (1973). Wade proposed a seven-
factor test for implementing the risk-utility test in products liability cases. Id. The first five 
factors of Wade’s test summarize the key components of a risk-utility comparison. Id. at 
837. They can be paraphrased as follows: (1) the “usefulness and desirability of the prod-
uct,” relative to the safe alternative; (2) the risk of injury generated by the product, relative 
to the safe alternative; (3) the availability (price and quantity) of the safe alternative; (4) 
the manufacturer’s ability to make the safe alternative without impairing the usefulness of 
the product; and (5) the user’s ability to avoid the danger by taking care. Id. The five fac-
tors described capture the determinants of the consumer welfare effect of choosing the 
challenged design instead of the safe alternative. See id. If consumers are fully aware of the 
dangers associated with the challenged design, then the five factors may be misleading as a 
description of the consumer welfare effect, because by choosing the challenged design 
over the safe alternative, consumers have revealed that their welfare is enhanced by con-
suming the challenged design. See Polinsky, supra note 23, at 115–16; Wade, supra, at 837–
38. If the risk characteristics of the challenged design are obvious to consumers, then 
products liability can do nothing to affect the frequency with which the dangerous product 
is consumed on the market. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 23, at 114–16. 
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must be positive for regulation to be socially beneficial. Another com-
ponent is the compliance cost to the firm. The net deterrence benefit is the 
difference between the consumer welfare (risk-utility) differential and 
e f
ior product reduces 
ns
latory decision is made, there is a social benefit from 
red
taking care, and the compliance cost would be the 
st 
rative, and risk costs, subject to a given level of 
ns
                                                                      
th irm’s compliance cost.25 
 The consumer welfare differential is not unconnected to the com-
pliance cost of the firm. In general, a superior product that enhances 
consumer welfare will often be more profitable to the firm. A regula-
tory order that prevents adoption of such a super
co umer welfare and increases compliance costs. 
 One other category of costs to consider is administrative costs. A 
specific regulatory regime might generate the greatest net deterrence 
benefit, yet its administrative costs may be so high that it is inferior to 
an alternative regulatory regime. Another category of costs consists of 
risk. In an environment where firms, the regulated entities, must invest 
before the regu
p ictability.26 
 This discussion suggests an objective for the choice of optimal reg-
ulatory regime: choose the regime in which the net benefit from deter-
rence exceeds the administrative costs by the greatest amount. Thus, if 
B represents the consumer welfare differential from safety regulation, C 
the compliance cost, AC the administrative costs, and R the risk cost, 
Regime 1 is preferable to Regime 2 if B1 – C1 – AC1 – R1 > B2 – C2 – AC2 
– R2. For comparison purposes, note that these terms would be defined 
differently in a routine case involving some safety precaution. In such a 
routine case, the benefit from deterrence would be the reduction in 
injury costs due to 
co of taking care. 
 There are different yet equivalent ways of describing the choice 
between regulatory regimes. For example, the decision could be de-
scribed as one of choosing the regime with the lowest sum of injury, 
compliance, administ
co umer welfare.27 
                                                
, Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy 
Task
e the sum of injury costs, 
acci  costs. Id. at 26–28. 
25 See Hylton, supra note 11, at 216. 
26 See Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini
s, 92 J. Pub. Econ. 426, 434–35 (2008). 
27 The cost minimization formulation of the objective of the tort system was proposed 
in Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 26–31 
(1970). Calabresi argued that the tort system should minimiz
dent avoidance costs, and administrative
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 The “error-cost” approach is another version of the same decision 
process.28 Suppose Regime 1 is preferable to Regime 2. An error lead-
in o a choice of Regime 2 has identifiable costs in the form of lower 
consumer welfare, greater compliance costs, or greater administrative 
costs. 
 In the preemption setting, the regime choice decision is before a 
court. The court can either dismiss the tort suit for an injury caused by 
the medical widget on the ground that the suit is
g t
 preempted by regula-
tion, or entertain the lawsuit and issue a judgment. The factors that 
should dete  would de-
rm
e conditions that determine whether a particular regulatory 
gim
e issues that fall within the agency’s scope of 
gu
pertise is helpful in reach-
g 
ssessment where technological 
issues are at stake, a jury may still have an informational advantage 
where an assessment of the net welfare effect requires knowledge of 
local conditions or common practices.29 
     
rmine the preemption decision are those that
te ine the choice between regulatory regimes. 
A. The Consumer Welfare (Risk-Utility) Component 
 The first step in assessing the choice between court and agency 
regulation is a consideration of the consumer welfare implications. 
What are th
re e has a preferable impact on consumer welfare? Three factors 
emerge: expertise, knowledge of local conditions, and political inde-
pendence. 
 The first factor is expertise. Some agencies, such as the FDA, are 
staffed with experts on th
re lation. Courts, on the other hand, rely on non-expert juries, 
though they often are aided in their decision making by the adversarial 
presentations of experts. 
 Where knowledge of the relevant industry or technology is helpful 
in making an assessment of the welfare implications of safety regula-
tion, an expert agency is clearly preferable to a jury. In terms of the 
framework developed, the net benefit from regulation is greater (other 
things being equal) in cases where agency ex
in accurate assessments of the risk-utility trade-off. The design of a 
medical widget is the common example of a case where agency exper-
tise is preferable to the expertise of a court. 
 A second factor is knowledge of local conditions. Although an ex-
pert agency can make a more accurate a
                                                                                                                 
28 See Hylton, supra note 11, at 211–14. 
29 The same may be said, and of course has been said, of a judge’s decision to consult a 
jury about a question of negligence. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 
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 For example, consider the preemption of a nuisance claim. Nui-
sance lawsuits typically involve disputes concerning local conditions.30 
Because of the locality concern in nuisance law, local conditions are a 
factor that must be considered in the course of determining whether a 
specific activity is a nuisance.31 A federal agency or statute that purports 
to preempt nuisance disputes should raise immediate concerns under 
the welfare test articulated here. The federal legislature, or a federal 
agency, is unlikely to know as much about local conditions in other areas 
of the country as do the people, including experts and potential jurors, 
who live there. It follows that implied preemption theories in the nui-
sance setting generally shift decision making to a less informed body.32 
 On the other hand, a medical widget, such as a new type of pace-
maker, is unlikely to raise issues requiring knowledge of local condi-
tions. The pacemaker is going to perform in a manner that will be de-
termined by the technology and by a patient’s personal conditions, 
which have nothing to do with local or common knowledge. Shifting 
decision making from the agency to the court, however, is likely to lead 
to more errors in the assessment of the consumer welfare impact of 
regulation. 
 A third factor that has to be considered is political independence.33 
Two common manifestations of a lack of political independence are 
vulnerability to industry capture and bias from pressure groups. The 
agency may have an information advantage, yet may also be vulnerable 
to control by members of the regulated industry. A court may be a supe-
rior forum in which to examine the net consumer welfare implications 
of regulation if the agency’s decision making is subject to bias. 
 One important feature of preemption analysis in the common law 
is that courts are in a position to observe agency proceedings in an ob-
jective light. They are able to determine whether an agency is vulner-
able to bias, and have made this determination in many cases.34 The 
                                                                                                                      
122
n common experience. See id. 
d A. Epstein, Federal Preemption, and Federal Common Law, in Nuisance Cases, 102 
Nw
gulatory decision making. See Epstein, 
supr g a federal common law approach, rather than 
fede
on theory largely on 
 
–23 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1991) (1881). Holmes offered a model of litigation in which 
the jury’s role is to inform the court o
30 Richar
. U. L. Rev. 551, 555–56 (2008). 
31 See id. 
32 Even where the nuisances cross state borders, there are arguments in favor of com-
mon law decision making rather than federal re
a note 30, at 567–68 (2008) (advocatin
ral preemption, in interstate nuisance cases). 
33 See Hylton, supra note 11, at 216–17. 
34 The best example is Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc. 96 F.3d 552, 556–57 (1st 
Cir. 1996). In that case, Judge Michael Boudin rejected the preempti
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most recent example of this extraordinary advantage was observed in 
2009 in Wyeth v. Levine, where the U.S. Supreme Court refused to defer 
to the agency’s own description of the preemptive effect of its regula-
tion on the ground that it did not consider the agency’s position reli-
able and objective.35 
 On the welfare analysis offered here, when a court observes vul-
nerability to bias, it is appropriate for the court to look with suspicion 
on the agency process. A more accurate agency process may be inferior, 
in some circumstances, to a court that is less accurate but less vulner-
able to bias. 
B. Compliance Costs 
 The second component of this welfare analysis is the cost of com-
pliance, to the extent that it can be separated from the consumer wel-
fare component just discussed. In general, compliance cost is the re-
duction in profit to the regulated firm (or industry) that results from 
product safety regulation. This approach treats the compliance cost as 
the opportunity cost of not pursuing some alternative design or plan 
barred by regulation. 
 The consumer welfare component discussed in the previous Sec-
tion will reflect some of the industry’s costs of compliance.36 If the reg-
ulatory authority requires the firm to produce a relatively safe alterna-
tive that is substantially more costly to supply than the risky product, 
that cost will be embedded into the product’s price, which will reduce 
consumer welfare. Thus, a careful assessment of the consumer welfare 
change from regulation will include costs that are passed on to con-
sumers. For example, if a product safety regulator banned all cars with 
less crash resistance than the typical tank, the price of cars would rise 
substantially as car manufacturers attempted to pass on the cost of pro-
ducing tank-like cars. Consumer welfare could be enhanced to the ex-
tent that cars were more crash resistant. But few consumers would be 
                                                                                                                      
the ground that the agency’s regulations governing the flammability of pajamas had been 
written by the industry rather than by independent safety analysts. Id. 
35 555 U.S. 555, 576–81 (2009). In particular, Justice John Paul Stevens rejected the 
FDA’s description of preemptive effect on the ground that the description was (1) a bald 
assertion rather than a legal “explanation,” which the Court could have considered in 
determining preemptive effect on its own; (2) inconsistent with the agency’s former posi-
tion on preemption; (3) inconsistent with Congress’s “purposes” regarding preemption; 
and (4) developed without a formal rulemaking process. Id. at 576–79. 
36 See supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text. 
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able to afford the new crash-resistant cars, so consumer welfare would 
be reduced overall by the regulatory order. 
 The elements of compliance cost that are not incorporated into 
the consumer welfare component consist of lost profit opportunities. If 
the industry is required to make crash-resistant cars the fall in sales may 
su
bstantially reduces industry profit could result in a reduction in 
ve
n. In addi-
on
st looks at 
nly
                                                                                                                     
re lt in an overall loss in industry profits, relative to the design option 
preferred by the industry. 
 In a perfectly competitive industry, the profit impact of regulation 
can be ignored without affecting the choice between regulatory re-
gimes. The reason is that profits will be competed away by the process 
of entry. A court deciding whether to preempt a lawsuit would not nec-
essarily commit an error if it did not even consider the profit impact of 
regulation. In monopolized industries or in industries in which innova-
tion is an important part of the competitive process, however, the profit 
effect may be a part of the total welfare assessment. A regulatory order 
that su
in stment in innovation—and hence a reduction in dynamic competi-
tion. 
 As a general rule, the loss in profits from a regulatory order is not 
factored into the legal framework in product safety regulation.37 The 
risk-utility test applied in products liability regulation does not factor in 
the profit impact of a decision to adopt an alternative desig
ti , federal regulatory agencies, such as the FDA, do not appear to 
consider explicitly the profit impact of a regulatory order.38 
 At first glance, the absence of weight given to the profit impact 
would appear to distinguish the risk-utility analysis used in products 
liability law from the negligence test. The negligence test compares the 
reduction in expected losses caused by a precaution with the burden of 
that precaution. Products liability law, in contrast, does not take into 
account the full burden of being forced to adopt a relatively safe design 
option. But this comparison is incomplete. The negligence te
o  a narrow definition of the burden of precaution. Lost profit op-
portunities are typically not part of the negligence analysis. 
 For example, if a driver takes greater care to avoid traffic injuries, 
the negligence analysis takes into account the burden of that care. But 
the negligence analysis does not consider the profits that were lost by 
taking additional care. If a driver said that he should be permitted to 
 
37 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1021, 1040 (2004). 
38 See id. (“Agencies typically estimate direct costs . . . . Such costs do not consider the 
lost profits, for example, that may be associated with a reduction in supply.”). 
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drive with less care in order to reach a specific location where he could 
receive a prize of one million dollars, that argument would be rejected 
under the negligence test. Of course, if the profit opportunity is suffi-
 opting for the risky design are sufficiently large, the firm might 
ill 
ntity. More-
over, in a competitive setting these opportunities will be transitory and, 
for this reason, are a ing. 
, the addi-
ona
 the lawsuit only 
th
y ap-
rov
                                                                                                                     
ciently large, the driver would not be deterred from speeding by the 
threat of liability. 
 In the same sense, product safety regulation typically does not con-
sider the lost profit opportunities that would result from a firm’s deci-
sion to opt for the relatively safe product design. Of course, if the prof-
its from
st decide to produce the risky design and pay the damage awards that 
result. 
 This feature of the law is not easy to defend on economic grounds, 
but it is still defensible. Lost profit opportunities are difficult for courts 
to measure objectively, and the information is entirely within the hands 
of the regulated party. A test that took lost profit opportunities into ac-
count might be too easily distorted to favor the regulated e
n infirm basis for long-range plann
C. Administrative Costs and Risk 
 One regulatory regime could be superior to another regulatory 
regime in terms of its effect on consumer welfare, and yet be inferior 
overall because of high administrative costs. In other words
ti l deterrence benefits from the more accurate regulatory regime 
may not be enough to offset greater costs of administration. 
 In the choice between regulatory regimes, an ideal approach would 
take administrative costs into account. If the regulatory regime is admin-
istratively more expensive, then a court would preempt
if e consumer welfare gain from having the agency, instead of the 
court, assess consumer welfare effects, is unambiguous. 
 In most products liability cases, the administrative costs factor 
should point toward preemption. The agency has moved first b
p ing the product. If courts hear disputes over questions considered 
by the agency, then additional administrative costs are incurred.39 
 
39 To the extent these administrative costs are borne by the regulated entities, they will 
often favor preemption. See Hills, supra note 9, at 29–30 (“Pro-preemption forces tend to 
be business and industry groups . . . , as the uniformity of regulation that preemption 
brings is good for business.”); see also Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the 
Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 53–54 (2006) 
(arguing that preemption is often asserted by businesses). 
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 Suppose, however, that the design issue concerns information that 
was not examined by the agency. The manufacturer might be accused 
of failing to provide a proper warning of a risk associated with the 
product, where the specific warning issue was not considered by the 
agency that approved the product design.40 The failure to warn claim 
ul
me of whom may 
e r
tion is likely to emerge over time, most obviously in the provision of 
inf
co d be considered by courts or by the agency. From this perspective, 
the administrative cost decision is not clear cut. The agency may be 
more expensive than the court. 
 Risk can be considered a part of administration. Setting expertise 
aside, courts involve multiple potential regulators, so
b elatively uninformed and others motivated by distributional inter-
ests, thus resulting in conflicting answers. Meanwhile, the agency is one 
regulator. The risk factor is typically higher in courts. 
 Indeed, although lost profit opportunities are typically not part of 
the decision standard of regulatory agencies, regulators are likely to be 
aware of the investments that firms have made to gain approval. They 
are also likely to recognize that a late change in the regulatory standard 
could have a substantial profit impact on the firm. The agencies know 
that the firms are repeat players;41 policies that discourage firms from 
investing can ultimately work to the agency’s disadvantage. Because of 
the repeat play between agency and industry, some degree of coopera-
ormation and of agency personnel, who are often drawn from indus-
try.42 Courts, on the other hand, are not playing a long game with the 
                                                                                                                      
40 See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563 (relating the trial court’s finding that the FDA “paid 
no more than passing attention” to the issue of whether to warn against a particular me-
thod of drug injection). 
 For a discussion of the advantages repeat players enjoy over “one-shot” parties 41 in the 
legal system, see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 96–103, 97 n.3, 107, 110–13 (1974). Galanter focuses 
on repeat players in litigation, though he lists firms regulated by agencies as repeat players, 
and their ability to secure favorable agency rules as an advantage. Id. at 107, 111–12. 
42 See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investiga-
tion, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 834 (2003) (suggesting that agencies may be biased toward 
industry because of their dependence on industry for information—a bias compounded 
by a “revolving door” between industry and agency employment); William T. Gormley Jr., 
A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 665, 681 (1979) (propos-
ing that former employees of a regulated industry are more likely to make agency deci-
sions  on a 
routin isdic-
tion. . Sci. 
335, 3
st courts, the procedural characteristics of the judicial process, and 
 
favorable to that industry). Agencies, who deal with the same industry groups
e basis, are less insulated from political pressure than are courts of general jur
See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt
51 (1974). 
The terminal character of many judicial appointments, the general jurisdic-
tion of mo
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industry, or at least may not be doing so intentionally. Juries are obvi-
ously not repeat players and sometimes are motivated by the desire to 
reward a needy plaintiff.43 Some courts may have an incentive to free 
ride on policies adopted by other courts: if courts in forty-nine states 
find that a particular design is defective, courts in the fiftieth state will 
have a strong incentive to find the same.44 The free-riding incentive will 
tend to generate path-dependent regulatory policy from the state 
courts—i.e., regulatory decisions dependent on the order in which dis-
putes are settled within the state courts. All of these factors suggest that 
the risk due to unpredictable regulatory standards is much greater in 
the courts than in the agencies. 
 More than unpredictability, time-inconsistent regulatory policy is an im-
portant risk associated with courts acting as product-design regulators.45 
The time-inconsistency problem arises when a firm must invest in the 
first period, and then government has the freedom to change its regula-
tory program in a later period.46 The government may have an incen-
tive to signal in the first period that it will maintain a consistent policy, 
and then sharply increase regulation or taxes in the second period. The 
first period signal of regulatory moderation is necessary in order to in-
duce the firm to invest. But once the firm has invested, the govern-
ment’s rational, short-term strategy is to adopt a confiscatory tax or 
regulatory policy. Of course, such a policy could be rational in the short 
term and yet reduce social welfare in the long term. Regulatory agencies 
may have sufficient repeat business with industry that such a bait-and-
switch game could prove ultimately harmful to the agency, or at least to 
                                                                                                                      
the freedom of judges from close annual supervision by appropriations com-
mittees, all operate to make the courts freer from . . . interest group pressures 
. . . than . . . the administrative agency, where these features are absent or at-
tenuated. 
Id. For an economics-based argument that industry captures agencies when wielding this 
political pressure, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & 
Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971) (“[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is de-
signed and operated primarily for its benefit.”). 
43 See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Judging Corporate Recklessness, in 
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide 77, 91–93 (2002) (find-
ing that jurors often substitute their own sense of morality—influenced by jurors’ sympa-
thies for one party or another—for legal standards in assessing punitive damages). 
44 The free-riding incentive is discussed openly by the court in Blankenship v. General 
Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 783–84 (W. Va. 1991). 
45 See Stanley Fischer, Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation and the Benevolent Dissembling 
Government, 2 J. Econ. Dynamics & Control 93, 97–98 (1980). 
46 See, e.g., id. On time consistency and regulation, see Alesina & Tabellini, supra note 
26, at 434–35. 
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agency officials who wish to work in the regulated industry. But courts 
are removed from this long-term relationship and thus can revise regu-
latory policy without incurring a risk of either retaliation or being held 
accountable for y, in order to 
 to examine the 
on
-
r-c
safety decision on consumer welfare. On the 
su
 The key factors influencing the application of the standard are 
expertise, local information, and political independence.50 The effect 
                                                           
a decline in innovation. A regulatory agenc
encourage investment, may have an incentive to bind itself to a consis-
tent policy over a substantial period of time. Courts have no such incen-
tive. 
II. An Optimal Rule on Preemption 
 My purpose in the foregoing discussion has been
ec omic factors that should lie behind a concrete decision on pre-
emption—specifically, a decision on product safety regulation. Preemp-
tion is a decision to choose one regulatory regime instead of another, 
or one regulatory regime in addition to another. The economics of that 
choice can be examined at a high level of generality. 
 The foregoing examination of the economics behind the choice 
between alternative regulatory regimes has direct implications for “er
ro ost” arguments about preemption. As noted earlier, the error- cost 
analysis is another way of expressing the concerns in an economic anal-
ysis of the choice between regulatory regimes.47 The economic factors 
identified in the previous discussion pinpoint the precise types of cost 
that arise as a result of an erroneous choice of regulatory regime.48 
 The most important component identified in the decision process 
is the effect of the product 
as mption that the common law standard applied by courts is effi-
cient,49 the court’s standard generally should govern the product safety 
issue. If this is valid as a default assumption, the preemption question 
should turn on how well the court would apply the optimal standard in 
comparison to the agency. 
                                                           
guing that efficiency results from greater litigation pressure applied to ineffi-
cien
ing text. 
47 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
49 See Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 8 Am. L. & 
Econ. Rev. 33, 35 (2006); Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 537–43 (presenting an effi-
ciency justification for products liability doctrine). Although the common law is unlikely to 
be perfectly efficient, there are well understood pressures toward efficiency in the system. 
See Hylton, supra, at 35 (discussing how common law incorporates private information into 
legal standards); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51, 53–
57 (1977) (ar
t rules). 
50 See supra notes 29–35 and accompany
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o gulation on industry profits is typically not part of the regulatory 
standard. The administrative cost and risk factors typically weigh in fa-
vor of letting the regulatory agency be the sole actor.
f re
ency is subject to influence or 
nd information. Local 
for
al information, it may be 
ab
e f
                                                                                                                     
51 
 The political independence factor suggests that courts should be 
less likely to find preemption if the ag
bias from interested parties.52 Again, courts are in the unique position 
of being able to assess the degree to which the agency’s regulatory ap-
proach is vulnerable to capture or bias. 
 The expertise and local information factors have similar implica-
tions for preemption, though pointing in different directions. If the 
common law standard governing liability (e.g., the risk-utility test) re-
quires technical or industry information to make an accurate assess-
ment, the court should be more likely to find preemption. In general, 
this will be the case when the common law standard and the agency 
standard are congruent. If, for example, the agency applies the risk-
utility test (or a version of it) in determining whether a product should 
be approved, a court applying the same standard should defer to the 
agency, given the agency’s superior expertise a
in mation implies the opposite call on preemption. If the common 
law standard requires the consideration of local information, a com-
mon law tort claim should not be preempted.53 
 One other information issue concerns timing. When a common 
law claim arises, the court may be able to consider information that was 
not available to the agency when it made its decision. Thus, even if the 
agency has superior expertise and technologic
un le to update its standard quickly in response to new information. 
The courts, on the other hand, may have a superior capacity to update 
the standard to incorporate new information. 
 This framework suggests a rule for preemption cases. Where the 
agency’s regulatory process is sufficiently rigorous and independent, a common 
law claim should be preempted if the regulatory standard and the common law 
standard are congruent, in the sense that the agency standard incorporates all of 
th actors that would be examined under the common law standard. Where 
the agency’s regulatory process is not rigorous and is vulnerable to cap-
ture or bias, courts should be reluctant to preempt common law claims. 
 This “congruence theory” implies some exceptions right away. If 
the common law standard takes advantage of information that is not 
 
51 See Hylton, supra note 11, at 212–14. 
52 See Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 556–57 (1st Cir. 1996); su-
pra note 34 and accompanying text. 
53 See Holmes, supra note 29, at 122–23. 
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available to the agency—such as later developing information on prod-
uct-related injuries—then preemption may be inappropriate. Similarly, 
 th
y compliance defense.55 Moreover, the congru-
ence theory is not implied by the language in most federal statutes; a 
search for legislative in ongruence as a guide-
ne 
 out a theory of preemption. In 
 e
Court’s decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.58 In the pre-Cipollone 
period, courts seldom found preemption and generally examined the 
if e common law standard relies on local information that would be 
unavailable to the regulatory agency, or not incorporated into the 
agency’s decision process, preemption would be inappropriate.54 
 Although congruence theory sounds simple, it indicates that pre-
emption depends on several variables: the information available to 
courts relative to the information available to the regulatory agency, 
time lags between the onset of claims and the framing of the regulatory 
standard, and the degree of agency independence. It is not equivalent 
to a simple regulator
tent is unlikely to suggest c
li for preemption. 
III. Some Applications 
 A quick look at some of the prominent preemption cases suggests 
that the congruence rule offers an explanation for the outcomes, even 
though the courts have struggled to set
an arlier article, I found evidence to support the congruence theory 
in a sample consisting of 243 federal court preemption disputes and 
118 state court preemption disputes.56 
 The preemption case law on products liability has gone through 
three periods.57 The first is before 1992, the year of the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
54 One might argue that there will always be late-developing and local bits of informa-
tion, and that for this reason, the congruence theory implies that preemption is never 
appropriate. I reject this position. It is impossible to escape the application of a rule of 
reason to these questions. Yes, there will always be late-developing information, but much 
of it will not be sufficiently important to change the reasonable assessment made in the 
earl
n. Rev. 1 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Ineffi-
cien FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 
24 S . Rev. 1437 (1994). 
6, 237 tbl. 4, 245 tbl. 6. 
992). 
ier period. In other words, the late information will be anticipated in the design or in 
the warning developed in the earlier period. 
55 For sophisticated economic arguments in favor of the regulatory compliance de-
fense, see generally Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regula-
tory Compliance Defense, 2 Am. L. & Eco
t Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the 
eton Hall L
56 Hylton, supra note 11, at 20
57 Id. at 207. 
58 505 U.S. 504 (1
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issue in terms of implied rather than express preemption.59 Many courts 
referred to regulatory agencies as setting minimum standards which 
co d be supplemented by requirements imposed under state tort law.ul
e preemption disputes in terms of the express 
ons for pre-
60 
 The second period of the preemption case law began with the Ci-
pollone decision, which found that a federal statute (the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act) expressly preempted state failure to 
warn claims based on inadequate cigarette labeling.61 Cipollone led 
many courts to analyz
preemption theory.62 
 The third period began in 1996 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,63 which rejected the express preemption 
approach of Cipollone. In Lohr, the Court found that defective design 
claims brought against the maker of a medical device were not pre-
empted, even though the relevant statute contained a preemption pro-
vision that could be read, in the style of Cipollone, as expressly preempt-
ing state tort law.64 Since Lohr, courts have returned to the implied 
preemption approach and have attempted to articulate reas
emption based on conflicts between state and federal law.65 
 Lohr itself is a decision that supports the congruence theory. The 
medical device in Lohr, a pacemaker, had been approved by the FDA 
under the “substantial equivalence” test, which permitted the market-
ing of devices that were equivalent to a device that was on the market 
before 1976.66 It is obvious that the substantial equivalence test is not 
congruent to the risk-utility test that would be applied by a court in a 
defective design lawsuit. The risk-utility test is an attempt to assess the 
net consumer welfare effect of moving from a relatively safe design to a 
risky alternative. It requires a careful examination of the challenged 
design. The FDA’s approval of the pacemaker in Lohr did not involve an 
assessment of the same information.67 Because the common law stan-
                                                                                                                      
59 Hylton, supra note 11, at 207–08 & n.4 (citing Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 
395 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
60 Id. at 207–08 & nn.3–4. 
61 505 U.S. at 530–31. 
62 See Hylton, supra note 11, at 208 (citing King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 996 
F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
63 518 U.S. 470 (1996) 
64 Id. at 501–03. 
65 See Hylton, supra note 11, at 209 (citing Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 
(11th Cir. 1997)). 
66 518 U.S. at 477–80. 
67 See id. at 480. 
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dard was not congruent to the regulatory standard, preemption would 
have been inappropriate under the theory offered here. 
 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., involving a balloon catheter approved by 
the FDA, was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2008 and provides 
the complementary result to Lohr.68 The Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiff’s common law design defect claim was preempted.69 Unlike 
the medical device at issue in Lohr, the device challenged in Riegel had 
been approved under the rigorous premarket approval process, in 
which the FDA thoroughly examines the risk-utility tradeoffs associated 
with a proposed medical device.70 Under the congruence theory, pre-
emption would be appropriate because the FDA had considered, dur-
g a
additional safety, as well as the likelihood that consumers would actually 
accept, through market purchases or through general compliance, 
      
in  lengthy approval process, the same issues that would be examined 
in a common law product-design claim. Not preempting the plaintiff’s 
claim would permit a relatively uninformed jury to contradict the de-
sign decisions of experts.71 
 Another prominent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Geier v. American 
Honda Motor Co.,72 decided in 2000, can likewise be explained by the 
congruence theory. The plaintiff brought a defective design claim based 
on Honda’s failure to install an airbag system.73 The conflicting federal 
regulatory order was Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which 
provided several compliance options to car manufacturers.74 The Court 
found that the plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the federal standard.75 
 The Geier decision can be justified on the basis of congruence the-
ory. In formulating the regulatory standard, the agency (the Depart-
ment of Transportation) had taken into account the factors that would 
be considered by a court in applying the risk-utility standard.76 The 
agency had considered the tradeoffs between the benefits and costs of 
                                                                                                                
. 552 U.S. 312, 321–30 (2008); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501–03. 
 a rational basis for refusing to 
find ote 42 and accompanying text. 
1 (2000). 
6. 
1. 
68 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc
69 Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321–30. 
70 See id. at 322–23; Lohr, 518 U.S. at 480. 
71 If a relatively uninformed jury took over the decision process of a group of experts, 
the expected costs of error associated with the decision process would be greater. In the 
theory set out here, it is important that the FDA’s decision process is rigorous and not 
obviously under the control of a political faction. If the FDA’s decision process were under 
the control of a political pressure group, a court would have
 preemption. See supra n
72 529 U.S. 86
73 Id. at 865. 
74 Id. at 875–7
75 Id. at 866. 
76 See id. at 877–8
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more burdensome safety requirements.77 Moreover, the agency con-
ducted its analysis with a higher level of expertise than could be ex-
pected of a court.78 There was no evidence of new information that had 
developed between the time of the agency’s standard and the plaintiff’s 
claim that would have led an objective observer to alter the agency’s 
analysis.79 Under these circumstances, the common law defective de-
sign claim required the application of a test that was congruent to that 
. There is almost always a potential for conflict between the 
fet
d-shoulder belts, survived.85 The Court held 
                                                                                                                     
applied by the federal agency. The claim should have been preempted, 
as it was. 
 The Geier Court focused on the conflict between federal and state 
design requirements respecting airbags.80 Under this Essay’s analysis, 
however, the focus should be on the extent to which the federal regula-
tory process has exhausted the issues that would be important in a 
court’s analysis of the defective design matter. The mere existence of 
potential conflicts should not be sufficient to find preemption. Indeed, 
if the conflict theory offered as the rationale in Geier were applied con-
sistently, the Supreme Court would find preemption far more frequently 
than it does
sa y standards implied by tort law and the standards imposed through 
regulation. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent decision on automobile 
safety standards, Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.,81 decided in 
2011, seems at first glance to be inconsistent with Geier, but the two de-
cisions can be reconciled and explained within the congruence model 
offered here.82 In Williamson, the Court considered a later version of 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which gave car manufac-
turers a choice to install either lap belts or lap-and-shoulder belts in 
rear inner seats (e.g., “middle seats or those next to a minivan’s 
aisle”).83 Mazda had installed only a lap belt in the rear aisle seat of the 
minivan the plaintiffs were driving when it was struck head-on by an-
other car.84 One family member, sitting in the rear aisle seat and wear-
ing the lap belt, was killed in the accident; the other family members, 
who were wearing lap-an
 
1, 883–85. 
mpanying text. 
iamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1134. 
77 Id. at 877–81. 
78 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 883. 
79 See id. at 877–8
80 See id. at 881. 
81 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011). 
82 See supra notes 47–54 and acco
83 Will
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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th  the regulation did not preempt the Williamson’s product-design 
lawsuit against Mazda.
at
osi-
n
fect claim.91 In Williamson, 
e 
deal of confusion as lower courts attempt to determine 
                                                                                                                     
86 
 Although it seems superficially that the plaintiffs’ suit should have 
been preempted under the precedent of Geier, the cases are distin-
guishable in a manner that is relevant to the preemption model of this 
Essay. The Court found that the Department of Transportation had not 
conducted an analysis of the choice between lap-only and lap-and-
shoulder belts at the same level of depth as the safety analysis in Geier.87 
The agency appeared to have given the manufacturers a choice be-
tween lap-only and lap-and-shoulder belts because it had no clear p
tio  on the safety question and, in the absence of a clear position, had 
chosen not to impose a significant cost burden on manufacturers.88 
 To put this in the terms of the congruence model, the Court 
found in Geier that the agency had considered the risk-utility issues, in 
addition to questions of compliance well beyond the scope of most ju-
dicial analyses of product-design disputes.89 In Williamson, the agency’s 
record indicated that it had not conducted a thorough risk-utility as-
sessment—and, even if it had, it did not base its regulatory decision on 
that assessment.90 In Geier, there was “congruence” in the sense that the 
agency had considered virtually all of the tradeoff issues that would 
have been raised by the plaintiff’s design de
th record did not suggest that the agency had made a judgment based 
on a consideration of the risk-utility issues.92 
 The congruence model provides a concise explanation of the dif-
ferent decisions in Geier and Williamson. The Court’s own explanation 
in Williamson is comparatively hard to understand. The Court distin-
guished Williamson from Geier on the ground that the Department of 
Transportation had not made the provision of choice to manufacturers a 
“significant objective” of its regulation in Williamson, unlike the regula-
tory program examined in Geier.93 The Court’s reasoning is likely to 
produce a great 
how one distinguishes significant from insignificant objectives of fed-
eral regulation. 
 
. 
at 1138–39. 
86 Id. at 1139–40. 
87 Id. at 1137–39. 
88 Id. at 1138–39. 
89 See 529 U.S. at 877–81. 
90 See 131 S. Ct. at 1138–40
91 See 529 U.S. at 877–81. 
92 See 131 S. Ct. 
93 Id. 
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 A final application is the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. 
Levine in 2009.94 The plaintiff brought a failure to warn claim against 
Wyeth after she contracted gangrene and had to have her forearm am-
putated, as a consequence of the injection of an anti-nausea drug into 
her vein.95 The intravenous method of drug delivery carried a signifi-
cant risk that the drug would enter an artery and cause gangrene.96 
The trial court found that Wyeth had failed to adequately warn of this 
risk.97 Wyeth argued that the failure to warn claim should have been 
ir warnings to reflect post-approval information on 
risks.101 Thus, as predicted under the congruence model, the claim was 
not preempted
means anything, in terms of an intelligible legal doctrine, in the absence 
of lication to a case.103 The term has generated articles 
                                                                                                                     
preempted because the firm’s label for the anti-nausea drug had been 
approved by the FDA.98 
 The Supreme Court, however, found that FDA approval did not 
prevent Wyeth from updating its warning to include new information 
on the risk of gangrene, information which had been building up over 
time between the date of the FDA’s approval and the date of the plain-
tiff’s lawsuit.99 In terms of the congruence theory, the plaintiff’s com-
mon law claim did not require an analysis that was congruent to the 
FDA’s analysis. The common law claim considered information that was 
available to Wyeth (specifically, post-approval experience with injuries 
caused by intravenous drug delivery) that was not available to the FDA 
at the time of approval.100 Moreover, the FDA rules permitted drug 
firms to update the
.102 
IV. Problems with Preemption Theory 
 The term “preemption” has sufficient generality and lack of defini-
tion to constitute an attractive nuisance for legal theorists. It sounds like 
it means something deep and important. But it is unclear whether it 
a specific app
 
. 555 (2009). 
heory of this Essay, one 
 
94 See 555 U.S
95 Id. at 558–59. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 562. 
98 Id. at 559. 
99 Id. at 569–73. 
100 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568–73. 
101 Id. at 570–71. 
102 Id. at 581; see supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
103 The preemption decisions involve regulatory matters that vary enormously. If courts 
tend toward optimal regulatory regime choices, the common law on preemption should vary 
according to the specific subject matter of regulation. Under the t
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offering general theories of preemption, and will continue to generate 
more.104 Most theories of preemption have offered wide-ranging discus-
sions of various opinions on the relationship between state and federal 
power and the source of Congress’s power to preempt state law.105 
 I have suggested so far that the theory of preemption, when viewed 
from an economic perspective, is simple and dependent on its concrete 
application, though the application involves consideration of several 
variables. If courts had been applying the congruence theory described 
here, most of the implied preemption decisions in the products liability 
area would have come out as they did. In other words, the congruence 
model provides a positive theory of the preemption case law. 
 The courts have failed to provide a consistent theory of the pre-
emption case law. One major source of the preemption controversy 
concerns the extent to which legislative intent should determine the 
outcomes in preemption cases.106 Legislative intent is difficult to divine 
in the vast majority of preemption disputes. Congress seldom makes its 
views clear on the extent to which a federal statute preempts state tort 
law. 
 Even if Congress were capable of making its views clear on the 
preemption question in every potential area of dispute, there would 
remain issues concerning its power to displace state law. Can Congress 
displace any state law? Should any statement that can be traced to some 
legislative authorization be assumed to prevail over state provisions that 
are inconsistent with it? These issues have made preemption a recur-
ring topic of controversy on the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                      
should predict the appearance of incoherence if one is searching for a general consistency in 
the preemption case law. Many scholars have referred to the apparent muddle of preemp-
tion. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L.J. 2085, 2085–86 
(2000); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 232–33 (2000). 
104 See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 4, at 807–08 (discussing preemption’s basis, if any, in 
the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, depending on the category 
of preemption); Hills, supra note 9, at 4 (arguing that preemption theories “need to accept 
the truism[] that the federal and state governments have largely overlapping jurisdic-
tions”); Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 2, at 1355–58, 1365–72 (arguing that the Su-
preme Court’s preemption doctrine has sought to establish “national regulatory uniform-
ity” across states and between state and federal government); Merrill, supra note 4, at 759–
69 (discussing preemption’s basis in the Supremacy Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause); Nelson, supra note 103, at 225–32 (arguing that preemption decisions “affect[] 
. . . the distribution of authority between the states and the federal government”). 
105 See, e.g., Hills, supra note 9, at 4; Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 2, at 1355–58, 
1365–72; Nelson, supra note 103, at 225–32. 
106 See, e.g., Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996); infra notes 117–120 and 
accompanying text. 
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A. The Federal Power Problem 
 Let us consider the power problem in a bit more detail. State tort 
laws protect people from injuries that can be attributed to negligence 
or some other legal breach, and these laws are understood to operate 
with a virtually unlimited scope. Congress’s power to regulate, in con-
trast, is limited by the terms of the Constitution. 
 If Congress passes a law regulating some activity that is already re-
gulated by state law, the first question that arises is whether the federal 
legislation is within the parameters of Congress’s power. In the prod-
ucts liability setting, this question has not been a serious issue for the 
most part.107 Markets in products that are regulated by federal agencies 
generally are national in scope, and modern conventional readings of 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce raise few if any con-
cerns about the scope of authority. There are other settings in which 
the question of power presents a serious issue, however, even on the 
basis of conventional views of the legislature’s authority. For example, 
suppose a federal statute claims to preempt all disputes over the design 
or the location of a facility, whenever those disputes are based on ad-
verse health effects resulting from that facility. A specific case is the Tel-
ecommunications Act of 1996, which includes a provision that explicitly 
preempts nuisance suits based on the health effects related to the siting 
of a cell phone tower.108 Although product-design questions appear to 
be within the accepted view of Congress’s power to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause, the location issue is arguably outside of Congress’s 
power.109 The impact on interstate commerce of siting a cell phone 
tower on the right side of the street versus the left side of the street is 
trivial, whereas the impact on local conditions could be substantial.110 
 Even if we are considering a design issue affecting interstate com-
merce, there remains the issue of what constitutes a federal law for pre-
                                                                                                                      
107 One exception is Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 582–88 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
108 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2006) (“No State 
or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction, 
and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental 
effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the 
Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.”). 
109 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–68 (1995). 
110 Lopez would appear to require some attempt to balance Congress’s interest in regu-
lating interstate commerce with the state’s interest in regulation. See id. at 574–83 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). When the question is simply whether a cell phone tower should be 
put on one corner or another corner, the federal interest in regulating interstate com-
merce would appear to be minimal relative to the state’s interest. 
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emption purposes. If Congress passes a statute that asserts state claims 
are preempted, this statute certainly qualifies as a law for preemption 
purposes. But if a federal agency adopts a regulation, or a statement of 
how its decisions should be interpreted (“optimal” as opposed to 
“minimal” standards),111 are these rules and statements to be regarded 
as laws that have preemptive effect?112 
 Preemption doctrine rests on an unsteady foundation. If the com-
position of the courts changes, and judges begin to ask more probing 
questions about the federal legislature’s power to preempt, some previ-
ous decisions on the scope of preemption may be overturned or rein-
terpreted as valid under grounds that are narrower than expressed in 
the initial decision. 
 These issues are troubling because if courts take the most expan-
sive view of the federal legislature’s power to preempt, either directly in 
statutes or indirectly through federal agencies, then rent-seeking 
schemes could replace state common law with rules specially designed 
to favor specific industries. For example, the provision of the 1996 Tel-
ecommunications Act that purports to preempt state nuisance claims 
over the location of cell phone towers may have been designed as a 
payoff to the telecommunications industry rather than a considered 
judgment about the most efficient forum for the resolution of nuisance 
claims.113 Of course, it may have been necessary to get the industry to 
support the legislation, but courts should be reluctant to permit por-
tions of state common law to be put on the trading table when indus-
tries negotiate with the legislature over regulatory statutes. 
 Suppose, for example, an industry approaches Congress and takes 
the position that it will support some specific proposed legislation in 
exchange for Congress’s preempting all state laws that are related to 
the subject of the proposed legislation. Or, to take a more extreme 
case, suppose the industry urges Congress to place the industry under a 
federal regulatory regime in exchange for preempting all state laws go-
verning the industry. If Congress accepts the industry’s offer, should a 
                                                                                                                      
111 Richard Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. 
Tort L., no. 1, 2006 at 1–2, available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss1/art4/ (click 
“download” to retrieve article); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agen-
cies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 227, 227–28 (2007). 
112 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 4, at 759–66 (discussing whether agency statements con-
stitute laws with preemptive effect). If a regulatory agency can secure preemptive effect by 
merely asserting it in its own regulations, then we have arrived at something of a paradox. 
Although courts often claim that they must search for legislative intent, the decision to 
find preemption has been within the discretion of courts. Id. at 760. 
113 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). 
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court uphold the agreement by preempting all state laws governing the 
industry?114 If a court were to do so, the state would be denied the pow-
er to regulate firms in the industry operating within its borders, whe-
reas the federal government would be the sole source of regulation— 
an outcome that would appear to contradict long-standing notions of 
the relationship between state and federal power.115 
 Even before any agreement is observed, however, the very notion 
that state laws could be put on the bargaining table between industry 
groups and federal legislators suggests a need for carefully drawn 
boundaries on the scope of preemption. The federal legislators’ incen-
tives may not be aligned with the welfare of the residents of a particular 
state, or state residents generally. Concentrated interest groups tend to 
have a greater influence on legislative processes than do diffuse inter-
ests,116 such as those of consumers generally. As the scope of preemp-
tion expands, the risk of diffuse interests being traded off to the benefit 
of concentrated interests increases. 
B. Legislative Intent 
 Legislative intent is another fertile source of instability in preemp-
tion law. Implied preemption is an established doctrine in the case 
law.117 Yet courts continue to refer to legislative intent as the funda-
mental basis for preemption.118 
                                                                                                                      
 
114 For a theory of statutory interpretation that proposes a “contract enforcement” ap-
proach to reading statutes generally, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Inde-
pendent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 877–79, 885 (1975). A 
contract enforcement approach must nevertheless be restrained by the limits the Constitu-
tion places on the terms of such contracts. Id. at 875 (quoting James M. Buchanan, Good 
Economics—Bad Law, 60 Va. L. Rev. 483, 491 (1974)). 
115 The Federalist No. 45, at 237 ( James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 
2009) (describing the powers of the federal government as “few and defined,” whereas 
those of the states are “numerous and indefinite”). Because the regulatory program en-
acted under this agreement would have to remain, at a minimum, consistent with constitu-
tional constraints on federal legislative power, there would have to be some boundaries 
enforced by courts on the terms of such agreements. Precisely what those boundaries are 
appears to be a largely unexplored question in the preemption literature. 
116 See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods 
and the Theory of Groups (2d prtg. 1971). This basic observation of public choice the-
ory provides the most serious welfare-based criticism of expansive theories of preemption. 
117 See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563–66; Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 344 
(2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–72 
(2000). Many discussions of preemption break down the implied preemption case law into 
various subcategories, but my doubts of the value of this effort are probably even greater 
than those suggested by other scholars. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 4, at 739 (breaking 
down implied preemption into “field preemption,” “conflict preemption,” and “obstacle 
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 The strategic basis for relying on a legislative intent argument is 
obvious. Where the source of preemption is the existence of a federal 
statute coupled with the Supremacy Clause, the case for preemption 
seems stronger if it seems to be a directive coming out of Congress ra-
ther than a finding made up by a court. But this introduces two sources 
of instability in the law. First, it is often difficult to find clear evidence of 
legislative intent. The preemption clauses are vague, and often coupled 
with equally vague saving clauses. To the extent that Congress can be 
said to have an opinion on preemption, that opinion is seldom made 
clear in federal statutes. Implied preemption arguments that are 
grounded in notions of legislative intent, such as those found in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., look unlikely 
to withstand questioning in later cases.119 
 The second problem with legislative intent is that it invites efforts 
to game the courts. Industries that negotiate with Congress over the 
design of federal regulation—whether the direct targets of the regula-
tion or their competitors—will make every effort to secure language in 
the statute that influences the legislative intent findings of courts. Any 
hard and fast rule that requires courts to find clear evidence of legisla-
tive intent to preempt will give parties attempting to influence Con-
gress a stronger incentive to write statutes that include language on the 
preemption issue.120 
                                                                                                                      
 
preemption”); Nelson, supra note 103, at 230–32 (same). At their core, preemption deci-
sions are determined by the specific regulatory choice problem facing a court. The crea-
tion of subcategories of implied preemption follows naturally from the effort to create a 
general legal theory of preemption, applicable to all disputes. I do not think such a gen-
eral theory can be developed with any acceptable degree of rigor. 
118 See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563–66; Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (commenting that “‘[t]he 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 
(1963))). 
119 See 552 U.S. at 343–44. Even where the arguments can withstand rigorous scrutiny 
in later opinions, they produce short-term confusion by relying on imputations of intent 
that are often confusing and sometimes obviously fictional. One good recent example is 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s theory in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., decided in 2011, 
that “choice” was not a significant objective behind the regulations examined in that case. 
131 S. Ct. 1131, 1137–40 (2011). How can a lower court determine whether a specific ob-
jective was significant when examining a federal regulatory scheme? The Court’s language 
in Williamson is likely to generate a spate of inconsistent rulings in the lower courts until 
the Court gets around to clarifying the meaning of “significance” in the Williamson deci-
sion. The congruence model of this Essay offers a simple way to understand Williamson, 
but the Court’s own theory of intent is both difficult to understand and unlikely to offer 
guidance. 
120 One familiar argument against preemption is that the legislature should be re-
quired to state its views clearly. Some commentators think that this will force Congress to 
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C. Another Path 
 The core of all of these problems is the term “preemption” and its 
basis in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.121 Although legal 
theorists have argued over the source of preemption, most courts have 
referred to the notion of federal law supremacy.122 But once preemp-
tion is understood to rest on this basis alone, all of the problems exam-
ined here enter the analysis. These problems are avoidable. 
 Preemption, at least in the context of federal regulatory action, 
serves an important function that is independent of the relationship 
between state and federal power. The courts could put preemption 
analysis on a firmer basis by removing it from its dependence on the 
notion of federal supremacy. The functional work of preemption doc-
trine, especially in the products liability field, could easily continue un-
der another name. 
 Courts have the power to find a common law basis for preemption 
doctrine, and are perfectly capable of doing so. The courts can continue 
to call it preemption, or they may choose to change the name, perhaps 
to “deference.” If courts declare an independent common law basis for 
preemption, they may be able to safeguard preemption doctrine from 
the deeper issues concerning the balance between state and federal 
power. The doctrine would rest on state power alone—specifically, the 
power of a common law court to recognize compliance with federal 
regulation as a type of defense in a tort action. 
 I must distinguish the common law preemption theory suggested 
here, however, from a pure regulatory compliance defense—i.e., a doc-
trine that treats compliance by itself as a defense. A regulatory compli-
ance defense goes too far under the theory of this Essay. The congru-
ence theory of this Essay is not equivalent to a regulatory compliance 
defense. Under the congruence theory, a firm could comply with fed-
eral regulation, yet still be found liable because of informational differ-
                                                                                                                      
be absolutely clear. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 39, at 16–39. For doubts about this approach, 
see Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of 
Legal Interpretation 118–48 (2006). Others think that agency processes should not be 
trusted. For an example of one article urging courts to search for clear intent to preempt, 
based largely on lack of trust of agency processes, see Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption 
Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695, 695–99 (2008). 
121 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
122 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 4, at 733–37. 
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ences, or because of a court’s assessment of the capture vulnerability of 
a federal agency.123 
 The congruence theory offered here is based on a functional view 
of preemption that withdraws tort law when the difference between net 
deterrence benefits and administrative costs is likely to be greater un-
der the regulatory regime than under the court regime. This functional 
view is largely independent of the issues surrounding the relationship 
between state power and federal regulatory power. Although court-
based regulation has been described traditionally as a supplement to 
federal agency regulation, under certain conditions it can reduce over-
all welfare.124 The case law suggests that courts have largely been suc-
cessful in identifying the conditions under which court-based regula-
tion reduces welfare; what is lacking is a straightforward theory and a 
stable legal foundation for the case law that has emerged. 
Conclusion 
 I have focused on preemption in the products liability setting, 
which is admittedly special in some respects. It involves agencies that 
have developed sophisticated approaches to regulation. Because agency 
action involves so many variables, many of the cases will inevitably raise 
implied preemption issues; the legislature cannot possibly address all of 
the preemption questions in statutes, even if it were to try. Given the 
choice between two active regulatory regimes—the agency and the 
courts—society’s welfare can be enhanced by discovering rules that 
channel some regulatory matters into the courts and leave others 
trapped within the agency. 
 Some other areas of preemption involve the direct displacement of 
state common law by the explicit terms of federal statutes. Where the 
legislature directly preempts some part of state common law through 
the terms of a statute, rather than indirectly through the action of a 
regulatory agency, the optimal regime choice framework of this Essay 
                                                                                                                      
123 The Restatement (Third) of Products Liability comes very close in its comment to sec-
tion 4(b) (on regulatory compliance as a defense) to proposing the congruence theory of 
this Essay. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 4 cmt. e (1998). The Re-
statement notes in its comment to 4(b) that a regulatory compliance defense may be appli-
cable when the regulation “was promulgated recently, . . . the specific standard addresses 
the very issue of product design or warning presented in the case before the court; and 
when the court is confident that the deliberative process by which the safety standard was 
established was full, fair, and thorough and reflected substantial expertise.” Id. Comment 
e, in my view, does a fair job of reflecting the case law on preemption in the products li-
ability setting. 
124 See Hylton, supra note 11, at 212–14. 
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remains applicable, but it encounters greater difficulties than in the 
agency preemption context. Although in most cases the common law 
process is superior to legislative bodies in generating rules for the pur-
pose of resolving controversies, this may not always be the case. State 
courts might adopt rules that frustrate contractual solutions to various 
types of market failure.125 A federal regulation that preempts such rules 
could enhance society’s welfare. The analysis of this Essay is still rele-
vant to this scenario, but only after realizing that the regimes that are to 
be compared are markets versus regulators, rather than courts versus 
regulators. 
 
125 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745, 1753 (2011) 
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s common law rule invali-
dating cell-phone arbitration agreement as unconscionable, because the rule frustrates 
Congress’s objective of treating arbitration as a contractual solution). It is possible that 
welfare could be enhanced by preempting inefficient legal restrictions on contractual 
choice with respect to arbitration. See generally Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to 
Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209 (2000) (discussing 
arbitration as a solution to a type of market failure). More specifically, litigation often oc-
curs under conditions in which the private and social incentives for litigation diverge, be-
cause the plaintiff does not internalize the full social costs of litigation. Steven Shavell, The 
Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333, 
333–34 (1982). The incentives for arbitration and waiver agreements to be formed are 
greatest precisely when the private and social incentive to litigation diverge to the greatest 
degree. See Hylton, supra, at 223–30, 263. Because of this, arbitration is, in some cases, a 
Coasean solution to socially inefficient litigation. See id. at 222. Arbitration can improve the 
joint welfare of plaintiffs and defendants when the arbitration forum is less expensive and 
more accurate than a court. See id. at 223, 225–26, 263. And even if the arbitration forum is 
less accurate than a court, an agreement to arbitrate could enhance the joint welfare of 
the parties if the cost savings are sufficient. Id. at 263. Given this, a federal law that pre-
empts state legal impediments to the formation of arbitration agreements could enhance 
social welfare. 
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